“There Are Some Surprises Down the Road”: ZeroDarkTony Announces $23,000 Fee Filing Against Krackhead Kenny

It is not the first time D’Amato has asked a California court to make an opposing party pay his legal bills. In May 2025, in a separate civil harassment case brought against him by a content creator known as Defender of Ants, D’Amato prevailed as the respondent and his attorney at the time, Steven Tamer, sought $18,528.75 in fees. The court denied that motion in full.[3] What that ruling found, and how it compares to what D’Amato said on stream about the fee request against Brooks, runs alongside the exhibits below.

Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6(s), the prevailing party in a civil harassment case, whichever side that turns out to be, may ask the court for attorney’s fees. The statute’s language is permissive: the prevailing party “may be awarded court costs and attorney’s fees, if any.” California courts have read that word literally. In Krug v. Maschmeier, the Court of Appeal held that a fee award under this provision is left to the trial court’s discretion, and that a judge is not required to find a losing party’s case frivolous or filed in bad faith before declining to award fees, or before awarding them.[4] Winning the restraining order makes a party eligible to ask. It does not make an award automatic.

“The Continued Harassment Has Inspired Me to Seek the Legal Fees”

D’Amato stated on stream that his decision to pursue fees was reactive: “the continued harassment has inspired me to seek the legal fees. And from my understanding, the legal fees are approximately $23,000 because when you file these ridiculous things over and over again, the lawyer has to look over them and charge by the hour.” He characterized the respondent’s third-party supporters as worsening the situation, saying, “the consequences are going to fall on the respondent, because of their third-party weirdos who just want to continue.” He added that he intends to renew the restraining order rather than let it lapse: “I don’t have to show up in five years to continue the RO. But at this point, I am, because it hasn’t stopped.”

D’Amato ties the $23,000 figure to the volume of filings from the other side. Whether the underlying filings were frivolous is a separate legal question from whether responding to them justifies the specific hours a fee motion claims. California courts evaluate that second question using what’s known as the lodestar method, reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable rate, with discretion to cut or deny a request found to be inflated relative to the work actually performed.

D’Amato also alleged that repeated harassment targeting a person’s sexuality rises to the level of criminal conduct: “to do that over and over and over and over and over again to somebody and call them to comment and target someone for their sexuality, that’s a hate crime.” He did not name the individual he described as the target of that conduct. “Hate crime” carries a specific statutory meaning in California under Penal Code § 422.55, describing a criminal charge or sentencing enhancement rather than a civil harassment finding. 

Exhibit A

D’Amato tells his audience that he obtained the restraining order specifically “to be left alone,” then accuses the respondent of tolerating third-party escalation: “they’re perfectly fine with all of these third-party idiots continuing the harassment.” He frames the fee filing as a consequence he did not have to pursue but chose to: “I’m doing the legal fees. I didn’t have to. But I’m going to.”

Timestamps: 00:12:15 – 00:17:18 | Watch with a free account

This segment establishes that D’Amato’s intention to pursue fees is discretionary. He attributes the decision to third-party conduct rather than actions by the respondent directly.

D’Amato is correct that the fee request is discretionary on his part; § 527.6(s) doesn’t obligate a prevailing party to seek fees, and nothing compels him to file. But his stated rationale here is worth a closer look. He attributes the fee filing to conduct by unnamed third parties, not to anything Brooks himself did in the litigation. A fee award under this statute compensates the prevailing party for the cost of litigating the action. 

It is not a mechanism for billing a respondent for the conduct of people who are not before the court. If the fee motion or its supporting declaration leans on third-party behavior to justify the amount sought, that marks a departure from what the statute is designed to cover.

The framing is consistent with a pattern D’Amato has used before: tying the cost or consequences toward his targets to the conduct of third parties, a structure that has the practical effect of discouraging criticism from anyone who might not want to become one of those third parties themselves; anyone who doesn’t want to be in the position of adding harm to Brooks.  

Exhibit B

D’Amato states the $23,000 figure and ties it explicitly to hourly attorney billing: “and the continued harassment has inspired me to seek the legal fees. And from my understanding, the legal fees are approximately $23,000 because when you file these ridiculous things over and over again, the lawyer has to look over them and charge by the hour.” He also signals that he believes additional legal consequences are coming for the respondent from parties other than himself: “there are some surprises down the road.”

Timestamps: 00:26:31 – 00:28:42 | Watch with a free account

D’Amato names a specific dollar amount and attributes it to attorney hours, while acknowledging he believes further legal action is coming from sources he does not identify. The nature and origin of the “surprises” he references are not specified in this clip.

The Los Angeles docket offers a candidate for what “these ridiculous things” refers to. Brooks filed a motion to disqualify the judge under Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1 on June 18, along with supporting declarations and a notice of continuance, in the same week the restraining order was ultimately granted.[2] Whether those filings were without merit is a question, however, it is unclear why D’Amato’s legal team would have had to respond to a motion to disqualify a judge that is responded to by the court. What the “surprises down the road” refers to is not established.

Exhibit C

D’Amato compares the current $23,000 fee claim to a prior $18,000 figure from a separate matter involving DOA aka Scott Hochstetter: “the bill for Scott was $18,000. The one for the respondent is $23,000. And they have it all documented and recorded.” He explains the billing structure as hourly attorney and office-staff time and closes by saying the respondent “is going to owe the attorney” directly, adding: “it is out of my hands.”

Timestamps: 00:32:08 – 00:35:30 | Watch with a free account

This segment places the current action in the context of at least one prior fee-recovery proceeding and provides D’Amato’s account of how the billing is structured. D’Amato frames the matter as outside his direct control once the attorney takes over, though he acknowledges the fees would flow back to him indirectly.

The claim that the fees are “all documented and recorded” is the same representation at issue in the earlier fee motion, the one a court rejected. There, Judge Melanie Ochoa found that Steven Tamer had provided no evidence D’Amato was personally obligated to pay the $18,528.75 requested, no invoices, no billing records, no retainer agreement, and that Tamer declined to say, citing privilege, whether D’Amato had actually been billed or paid anything at all.[3] The ruling also noted a gap between Tamer’s advertised hourly rate of $375 and the $675 rate reflected in the motion, and cited Serrano v. Unruh for the principle that a fee request found to be unreasonably inflated can be denied in full rather than simply reduced.[3][6] D’Amato’s legal costs in that matter were financed in part through “Legal Fund” donations and “Super Chats” from his audience, and the court held that arrangement did not, by itself, establish that D’Amato was personally liable for the amount his attorney sought.[3]

The current motion is filed under different counsel, Christopher Chaney rather than Steven Tamer, so the documentation and billing problems that sank the earlier request do not automatically carry over. But the threshold legal question is the same one a court will have to answer again: not whether the amount is large, but whether D’Amato personally incurred an obligation to pay it, distinct from whatever his audience has funded on his behalf. Separately, “the respondent is going to owe the attorney directly” is not how a § 527.6(s) award typically works. A fee award runs from the losing party to the prevailing party.  One would assume D’Amato paid the attorney directly and a fee award reimburse him.

Exhibit D

D’Amato states he expects papers to be served within the week: “I would imagine there would be some papers being served this week.” He then characterizes repeated harassment targeting someone’s sexuality as criminal: “you can’t target someone for their sexuality, religion, disabilities.” He confirms the restraining order and states he is glad he obtained it: “I’m glad that I went and I got the RO against him.”

Timestamps: 00:36:50 – 00:44:11 | Watch with a free account

This segment combines a stated service timeline with a hate-crime characterization, though D’Amato does not name the individual he alleges was targeted or identify who he believes is responsible for that conduct. He states he will not discuss further legal steps publicly beyond what he disclosed here: “they could just figure it out when it happens.” Across the four clips, D’Amato discloses an active restraining order, states a $23,000 attorney-fee claim is being filed this week, and says additional unspecified legal action is expected, placing the full record on stream before any papers have been formally served.

One fact from the docket does not come from anything D’Amato has said. On April 9, 2026, the court granted Brooks a fee waiver, Judicial Council Form FW-003, finding him eligible for indigent status under California law.[2] That is not an inference drawn from D’Amato’s commentary. It is an existing judicial finding on the record in this case, and California courts have treated a respondent’s ability to pay as one factor within the broader discretionary calculus under § 527.6(s), part of the same access-to-justice concern that shaped the ruling against D’Amato’s prior fee request.

A more detailed explanation of how fee motions operate under California’s civil harassment statute, along with the record in D’Amato v. Brooks, will be provided in a separate piece once we have reviewed the motion.

Sources

• Original YouTube Video
• Full SRT Transcript: for HNZ Supporters
• Full Text Transcript: for HNZ Supporters
• Full Chat Transcript: for HNZ Supporters
• Date: 2026-08-17
• Stream ID: YOUTUBE · dGmtsB_O0MU

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